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The 1960s brought the promise of a new era of social justice for all 
Americans. Indeed, the overturning of official, state-sanctioned racial structures 
was a watershed in national life. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the 
earlier momentum of the civil rights period dissipated as the end of the postwar 
economic expansion ushered in a crisis of American culture and polity. "Sym­
bolic racism" emerged as a powerful political and ideological instrument to 
buttress resistance to racial and ethnic equality. During the 1980s, a Reagan 
administration antagonistic to the aspirations of minorities and the working 
classes in general was able to impose an array of policies (and a discourse) on the 
nation which polarized ethnic groups and classes even more rigidly. In Reaganism, 
one sees the congruence and power of symbolic racism and class-targeted 
economic policy, the capacity of elite forces to carry out economic restructuring 
at the cost of minority equality. What the post-civil rights period has largely done 
is to stack the American deck against African Americans and Hispanics. 
The 1970s marked a watershed in the economy of the United States, the 
passage from the "effortless growth" of the initial postwar period to a harsher 
age. It was a decade which witnessed price escalation, sharp economic recession, 
and culminated in the onset of stagflation. The decline of the much heralded 
"American Standard of Living" was felt in many quarters and especially 
throughout the lower middle and working classes.1 
At the core were deeply-rooted and apparently unsolvable structural problems 
reflecting an altered American global position: the inability of major corpora­
tions to raise productivity and profit levels and their loss of global and domestic 
competitiveness; the demise of substantial numbers of industrial jobs to export 
and automation strategies; instability in financial markets; and, above all, the end 
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of dependable, stable growth. In an important work appearing at decade's end, 
Paul Blumberg found "the chronic stagnation of living standards" begetting a 
"psychology of scarcity, limits and retrenchment,,2 
Economic decline severely undermined what had been deep public confi­
dence in political institutions. Elected on a platform pledged to restore the public 
trust, the Carter administration (1977-81) lacked the political skills, sense of 
priorities, and outright capacity needed to reverse the deterioration. Moreover, 
major Carter policies from 1978 on-social budget cutting, inflationary control 
through recession and military buildup-were a repudiation of initial commit­
ments to a more equitable society. This revealed the exhaustion of the possibilities 
of liberal corporatism (and also prefigured the coming of Reaganism).3 In the 
increasing hostility of business circles to various facets of the welfare state, in the 
newly emergent neo-conservative trend with its opposition to the claims of 
ethnic and sexual minorities, the face of the decade-to-come was visible. By 
1980, the lack of a viable alternative economic strategy (or political coalition) set 
the stage for the bold experimentation of the Reagan period. 
Reaganism set the tone of political discourse in the 1980s and helped carry 
oJ,lt a profound transformation in both public and private spheres. In retrospect, 
it amounted to a grand and risky attempt to transcend the crisis of corporate­
liberalism. The curious political coalition that put Ronald Reagan in the White 
House-right wing western energy, agribusiness and fmancial entrepreneurs, 
southern religious fundamentalists, traditional upper middle class Republicans, 
and crucial numbers of disillusioned urban blue collar and lower white collar 
workers-was largely held intact by Reagan's  fmn advocacy of high powered 
economic growth, low inflation and national renewal. 
There was an additional source of active bonding here: racism. The civil 
rights movement had, among its great successes, succeeded in undermining the 
ideological power of white supremacy. Biological racism and its accompanying 
Jim Crow institutions had been largely discredited during the upsurge of the 
1960s. Yet, racism was sustained as an American norm and continued to be 
central to the way in which white Americans ordered the universe. In a huge, 
disparate and deeply competitive nation, anti-black, anti-Hispanic sentiment 
served as a force for unity and stability among the majority population, displacing 
class conflicts into race and legitimizing the social structure.4 It, furthermore, 
conferred some definite material and psychological benefits upon whites. In 
brief, the civil rights revolution had failed to transform the cultural belief system 
that held the humanity and culture of African and (in a somewhat different 
degree) Hispanic Americans to be less than their own. 5 
This is a crucial aspect of the social justice "dilemma" in the United States 
today. Benjamin Ringer has argued that "America's response to and treatment 
of its racial minorities have had a dual character . . .  built into its structural and 
historical origins."6 Because of deep institutional racial discrimination and the 
resilience of racial/ethnic hierarchies, some minorities have been acutely vul­
nerable to the functioning of marketplace capitalism; they have needed profound 
governmental interventions to secure entre into the primary economic sector, 
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and, once in, something approaching equal opportunity. What the new "sym­
bolic racism" which emerged as the successor to the traditional Jim Crow racism 
in the late 1960s did was to legitimize resistance to racial equality and equality 
of opportunity and delegitimize state intervention for minority social justice. 
Symbolic racism has been an ideology attuned to the needs of the post-civil 
rights era. New "cultural" stereotypes have appeared to replace the more overt 
biologically-determined ones. African Americans and Hispanics in the labor 
market have been characterized as lacking the skills and motivation to perform 
in a high skill economy. What reinforced the power of symbolic racism was its 
incorporation of the dominant American ideology of individualism, which 
explains social structure and wealth and poverty by reference to individual 
character and talents'? A society where "social solidarity" 'is based upon 
"separating those who are deserving from those who are not," seeks to blame and 
discredit the "undeserving.,,8 
The context presented here is that of an "open" system ready to reward the 
capable and motivated. Symbolic racism uses the individualistic ethos to 
attribute non-white poverty, unemployment and low occupational status to 
personal failings. To explain why African Americans and Hispanics occupy a 
grossly disproportionate percentage of jobs in the lower wage, lower promotion, 
lower security secondary economic sector, why they often leave the labor market 
in despair, etc., it offers the notion of "cultural" and "personality" dysfunctions. 
Reaganism: The Congruence of Class Politics and Racism 
Reaganism marked the culmination of years of white backlash to the civil 
rights revolution. White counter-mobilization on a massive (and national) scale 
had frrst found its political focus in the right wing populist presidential campaigns 
of George Wallace. Wallace's success in exploiting the economic insecurities 
and failed expectations as well as the racial animosities and fears of the lower 
middle and working classes prompted Republican strategists to embrace white 
southerners (and anti-black sentiment, in general) as the key to a "permanent" 
lock on the White House.9 Reagan's decisive 1980 election victory capitalized 
heavily on racially motivated voters to sweep the South, while winning substan­
tial support among those northern white ethnics alienated from the pro-minority 
stance of the national Democratic Party. The prolonged economic crisis had 
accentuated the struggles between majority and minority citizens for jobs and 
social services; meanwhile, increasing black political clout had made political 
action an imperative for groups espousing a "defensive" white ethnicity.l0 
In short, the presidential triumph of Ronald Reagan marked the ascendence 
of the politics of race and resentment; it provided a fearful white majority with 
a federal state committed to the racial status quo; it provided the New Right (and 
its agenda of "social control" over racial majorities) a powerful place at the center 
of policymaking. 
The nature of Reagan' s core political base, in addition to his own corporate 
and ideological loyalties, meant certain business sectors (and the classes which 
owned and managed them) were to be the locomotive of economic expansion. 
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Resources and initiatives were transferred from the public to private sector. The 
scope of the federal regulatory mission was markedly reduced. To further capital 
accumulation in favored sectors, state spending was shifted from social services 
to the military, progressive taxation undermined, and an anti-trade union 
environment sustained, aimed at exacting wage discipline and concessions from 
the workforce. This amounted to a partial dismantling of the New Deal social 
contract, in essence, "a coherent ideological attack on the principles that have 
governed policy in this country for the last half-century."ll 
A centerpiece of Reagan program strategy was the diminishing of the 
welfare state. Here, a key thrust was the reduction/repeal of various public 
entitlements and programs directed at aiding poor and working class Americans. 
Only the "truly needy," as defined by the administration, would be helped. This 
was, in effect, to be the Reagan solution to what O'Connor has called, "the main 
domestic problem facing big capital"-the social wages built up since the New 
Deal that constituted the American version of "Social Democracy."12 Such in­
come maintenance programs were targets because they enlarged workers' 
bargaining power and autonomy vis-a-vis capital. During the administration's 
first year in office, it "made the severest cuts in social spending in our history ."13 
It is significant for our ethnic/racial polarization thesis to note that ultimately 
those programs with a broad base in the (disproportionately white) middle strata 
such as social security and veterans benefits proved fairly resistant to cutting. In 
contrast, those oriented to the (disproportionately black and Hispanic) poor and 
working poor, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, vocational 
education, public service employment, etc. were dramatically slashed. 14 What 
Reagan policy makers exploited was the partial legitimacy of programs oriented 
to the poor/working poor which (under the dominion of the "culture of indi­
vidualism") bore the onus of being "handouts" to the "unworthy.',15 
In retrospect, some of the Reagan administration's most ambitious initia­
tives were aimed at revamping the post-New Deal social contract between citizen 
and state. Thus, the objectives of the historic 1981 tax cut (and subsequent 
weakening of the federal financial structure) were not simply to reward affluent 
Republican voters and stimulate "supply side" mechanisms, but also to diminish 
the capacity of the state to provide an effective social welfare system and take 
new social policy initiatives. Citizens would be forced to radically reduce their 
expectations of what services and the amount of social wages government could 
reasonably provide. The goal, then (which was partly thwarted by Reagan 
ineptitude and congressional resistance), was to delink economic rights from 
citizens' traditional political rights in the United States. Indeed, the post-Reagan 
$3 trillion federal debt and massi ve annual deficits have placed severe constraints 
on restoration (or expansion) of future social welfare budgets. 
The immediate consequences of the Reagan program were most apparent in 
certain minority communities. For instance, for the estimated 1.6 million of four 
million black families with children receiving AFDC monies, between 1974 and 
1984, average payments per family declined one-third in real terms with the 
steepest cuts in the Reagan years. Cutbacks in Pell grants to disadvantaged 
8 
students, reductions in federal funds for public housing, and the elimination of 
some federal jobs were felt disproportionately in the African American and 
Hispanic communities. The fIrst generation of African American and Hispanic 
mayors found themselves confronting enormous demands for services by 
beleagered citizens, while federal cutbacks ravaged their budgets. 
The neo-conservative assault on the welfare state carried an unstated (but 
clearly implicit) message that the most unworthy programs were those most 
crucial to minority needs. By arraying the prestige and power of the federal 
government against special minority supports in education and employment, the 
Reagan administration stigmatized them. Both the President and the U.S. 
Attorney General pointedly referred to affIrmative action as "reverse discrimi­
nation" and narrowed government suits to cases of clear "intent" Federal action 
on behalf of equal opportunity declined precipitously. This, in turn, helped to 
legitimize the type of racism which is most functional to privileged racial and 
economic groups in present times; what Pettigrew and Martin refer to as the 
"modem racial prejudice which is generally more subtle, indirect and ostensibly 
non-racial," tends to be common in hiring and promotion processes. 16 In a time 
of economic stagnation and deep anxiety for white workers (whose standard of 
living is increasingly precarious), the clear absence of state sanction and moral 
authority on behalf of equity not only intensifies normal "trench warfare" 
between different groups for advantages, but encourages yet more explicit racist 
attitudes. 
If African Americans and Hispanics did succeed in achieving middle strata 
status in unprecedented numbers during the 1960s, it was largely because of 
direct federal bars on official discrimination and promotion of minority education 
and employment 17 The end of favorable state intervention (in conjunction with 
economic changes) has crippled that movement towards a minority social 
structure resembling the majority one. When a government, by intention or by­
product, assaults the position of the "popular classes" in the United States, it 
inevitably wreaks the most havoc on subordinate ethnic and racial groups. 
The Reagan administration was determined to serve the interests of its upper 
middle and upper class core constituencies, exhalting the market mechanism and 
eroding the capacity of the welfare state. The credo was to reward the financially 
successful and those placed to be still more so. Thus, its definition of who and 
what constituted legitimate clients for state services included individuals and 
corporations, made or on-the-make, while excluding disadvantaged economic, 
ethnic, or gender groups. Reagan's literal enunciation of a "colorblind" bias in 
state policy left African Americans and Hispanics of all classes (but especially. 
the working class and poor) subject to the vagaries of an increasingly harsh 
market system. 
The New Economic Order 
Minority social justice has always been closely tied to the state of the labor 
market. During the 1960s, the expansion of the technical-clerical-professional 
areas of employment was vital to the breaking of traditional racial/ethnic 
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stereotypes and roles in the workplace and to the growth of black and Hispanic 
middle classes. A historic restructuring of the U.S. labor market began in the 
middle 1970s. This was in response to radically altered market, financial and 
technological conditions and the loss of the "natural" American global dominance 
of the early post-war era. In the Reagan period, because of business's 
unchallengeable strength and its access to the levers of state power, restructuring 
took the form of disinvestment and elimination of productive capacity, union 
bashing, and changes in work organization, reducing the labor component in 
production, outsourcing for goods in cheap labor areas abroad, and "paper 
entrepreneurship."  IS 
The most dramatic break was the monopoly sector's jettisoning of the much 
lauded "social contract" it had negotiated with labor after World War Two. Even 
in industries where powerful trade unions had once wielded great authority 
(airlines, trucking, automobiles, electrical goods) concessionary contracts and 
two-tier employment schemes became common. A transformed labor market 
featured a core of full-time "regulators," surrounded by a growing periphery of 
part-timers, temporaries, home and subcontracted workers (lacking medical 
benefits, paid vacations and private pensions and bearing the costs of market 
"dislocations "). 19 
There has been a momentous change in the nature of job generation, itself. 
During the quarter-century after 1950, the labor market generated a clear 
majority of well-paying skilled positions; contemporary new jobs, however, are 
centered in the lower to medium rungs of the service sector. Indeed, some eighty­
five percent were found by one study to be in the lowest paid services.20 These 
workers, along with the official jobless (over five percent in the "tight" labor 
market of 1990) are those whom Emma Rothschild refers to when she remarks: 
"The market-welfare state eludes tens of millions of Americans at the periphery 
of the full employment economy. "21 
This transformation was abetted by the Reaganist state which provided a 
lucrative umbrella of deregulation and tax incentives for the historic leaders of 
American manufacturing to pursue the "abandonment of production." Market 
logic and state policy made "conglomerate mania " and diversification into 
financial services more profitable than product innovation and quality produc­
tion. Deregulation of fmancial markets has resulted in an unprecedented wave of 
hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts which left hugely indebted corporations 
to pare off divisions and workers. Between 1979 and 1985,2.3 million industrial 
jobs disappeared, precisely the stable, high wage employment which lay at the 
cornerstone of blue collar aspirations for middle class lives.22 
American labor markets have become more hostile to social mobility. A 
major pole of Reagan-era job creation was the lower echelons of service 
industries like fmance, legal services, sales, health, and insurance.23 Between 1983 
and 1988, manufacturing provided exactly eight percent of net new jobs. So the 
movement from manufacturing to services has impacted real income levels; by 
1967, shrinking industries paid 41.5 percent more in annual wages than did the 
expanding ones.24 As Katharine Newman so ably illustrates, downmobility has 
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become a common phenomenon in large sections of the workforce. The restruc­
tured American economy continues to generate jobs supporting upper middle 
class lifestyles, but the bulk of new employment will be in retail services, office 
work, cleaning, waiting and waitressing (2.5 million additional jobs are pro­
jected for the restaurant fast food sector in 1986-2(00).25 
The harshness of the new labor market is apparent in the stagnation of family 
incomes over the last decade-even with the mobilization of more family (i.e., 
female) workers. In the decade that elapsed from 1975 to 1985, adjusted median 
family income rose but a pittance, $27,421 to $27,735.26 The best the much 
celebrated Reagan growth trend could do was return household incomes to early 
1970s levels after a slight decline. Given the rapid rise in housing, medical, and 
educational costs, however, stagnancy really meant a declining standard of 
living and lessened future opportunities. 
Previous growth eras (especially the two world wars and the 1950s to middle 
1960s) carried an "equity dividend. " The force of economic expansion and labor 
shortage buoyed lower income Americans (and disadvantaged minorities, in 
particular) into more highly skilled, better paid jobs in the occupational structure. 
Therein lay the basis for the dual theories of class and race "convergence" in the 
United States. Yet, Reagan policies were directed at enhancing property-based 
incomes at the cost of wages and thus succeeded in making the boom the vehicle 
for the further enrichment of the rich. The nation is more acutely class polarized 
than at any time since 1947; when Reagan left office, one-quarter of all American 
households had a total net worth of less than $5,000, while the top one percent 
owned thirty percent of total household wealth.27 The Reagan period was one of 
both absolute and relative gain for the wealthiest twenty to forty percent of 
American families (and especially, the top one to five percent), at the cost of the 
stagnation and decline of the rest.28 
The Victims or the Great Restructuring 
In a society where there remains strong congruence between race/ethnicity 
and class, to say the sacrifices of the Reagan "miracle " have been borne by the 
poor and lower middle strata is to say that they have been unduly borne by 
African American and Hispanics. Between 1980 and 1986, the earnings of full­
time year-round African American workers fell from seventy-seven percent to 
seventy-three percent that of whites; given the same family type, poverty was 
higher for African Americans than whites. 29 In comparing high school gradu­
ates, whites had incomes almost $4,000 higher than Hispanics; white high school 
graduates earned $3,000 more than African Americans and $2,000 more than 
Hispanics.30 
These disparities are the result of both continuing racial discrimination in 
the labor market and the new (and diminished) opportunity structure. Bonacich 
makes the link here arguing that "race and ethnicity reflect a deeper reality 
namely class relations and dynamics.,,31 Despite the continuing emergence of 
African American and Hispanic middle classes, ethnic stratification has been 
rigidified; a complex new division of labor organized along global lines had 
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removed entry level positions in white and blue collar work and made a large 
number of African American and Hispanic workers either dependent upon 
substandard or superfluous jobs. The restructuring of central city economic 
functions from manufacturing, warehousing, and transportation to information 
processing and financial services played special havoc with opportunities for 
young African Americans and Hispanics to gain stable, decent employment in 
the unionized heavy industrial sector.32 
The irony here-that after decades of exclusion, African Americans and 
Hispanics would finally gain entry into the coveted primary industrial sector only 
to have "deindustrialization" arrive-is a tragic one. This meant the savaging of 
the stable, well-paid blue collar group (out of which the future minority middle 
class would logically berecruited). Industrial restructuring precluded the "normal" 
hiring of the second and third generations of these workers. In 1976, for example, 
forty-six percent of African American workers, twenty to twenty-four years of 
age, were employed as blue collar craft operatives; by 1984, this was reduced to 
twenty percent 33 Given such reduced possibilities of locating decent, stable 
work, data showing that African American men spend substantially less of their 
lives in the "official" workforce than whites, and often leave it in their prime 
working years, is readily understandable.34 
A cautionary note here. The importance of economic restructuring and 
decay in maintaining minority subordination in labor marlcets is clear. But they 
are interlinked with the response of political-economic elites to the questions of 
allocating "burdens" in resolving the economic crisis and to the deep-seated (and 
exploitable) racism of the majority population. Ultimately, these forces, together 
with the intrinsic logic of a hierarchic system, made the variety of instruments 
utilized by African Americans and Hispanics to create a society of real equality 
ineffectual. In a recent article, the noted race relations scholar, Lewis Killian, 
stressed just this point 
The size of the piece of pie is not as critical in these times 
as is the shrinking of the fraction of the pie left for the have­
nots in a class-polarized society.35 
Thus, instead of racial convergence, we fmd a continuing tendency for 
majority and minority workers to start at different entry levels in the job market, 
and have different pay and promotion proSpects.36 A significantly higher pro­
portion of Hispanics and African Americans continue to work in the more 
unstable and less lucrative "secondary" economic sector.37 Throughout the years 
of economic downturn in the 1970s and early 1980s, the incomes of minority 
families fell faster than those of whites, only to recover considerably more slow I y 
during the subsequent 1980s expansion.38 In the generally prosperous year of 
1986, median wages and salary earnings of African American workers were 
sixty-three percent of white workers and Hispanics made slightly less than that 
figure. It is also noteworthy that the relative incomes of African American and 
Hispanic families have fallen since the late 1970s.39 African American unem­
ployment has remained consistently at levels two to three times that of whites; 
Hispanic joblessness has been intermediate between the two others. In 1987, for 
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example, African American unemployment was at thirteen percent; Hispanic, 
8.8 percent and white slightly over five percent. These figures help account for 
African American and Hispanic poverty rates double to triple white rates.41 
The weakening of the welfare state and growing labor market segmentation 
structures are at the source of the crisis of African American and Hispanic youth. 
Lacking specialized training, solid job networks, adequate transportation, access 
to suburban labor markets, and standard language competency, minority high 
school graduates and drop-outs must take the leavings of a bifurcated labor 
market. There is, of course, "lingering" institutional discrimination to contend 
with also. 
The severity of the youth crisis is most revealing at the level of the family. 
In general, "an economic disaster has afflicted America's  younger families," but 
"young black and Hispanic families have suffered particularly severe earnings 
and income loss. "42 Young African American families saw their earnings decline 
by one-half between 1973 and 1986; young Hispanic families, by one-third. The 
steep fall in African American male incomes undermined their ability to sustain 
families and resulted in a startling increase in young (largely single parent) 
households in poverty.43 
Young working class and poor white families have also suffered from recent 
income losses and an acute lack of access to affordable housing. But ethnic 
hierarchies and differential resources continue to favor them over minorities; 
young whites at every occupational level earn more than their African American 
and Hispanic counterparts. Young African American family income declined 
from sixty percent of whites to forty-six percent between 1973 and 1986; 
Hispanics from sixty-eight to sixty-two percent 44 This may well be a long-term 
trend; the rigidities of the nation's  economic and educational structures make 
reversal of the pattern of growing youth inequality problematic, at least One 
probable scenario of continuing racial (and gender) occupational segregation is 
alluded to in a Bureau of Labor Statistics report: "The future labor force is 
projected to be increasingly minority and female and they are destined for lower 
occupations. "45 
Conclusion 
In a multiethnic nation like the United States, social justice means the full 
and equal access by minority groups to the whole range of societal opportunities 
and resources. The contemporary American political-economy, has, however, 
since the onset of economic crisis and political reaction in the late 1960s, been 
unfavorable to this. The Reagan administration, political beneficiary of the 
widespread desire to halt minority movement towards equality ("symbolic 
racism"), adopted social and economic policies which rewarded the affluent 
classes and punished those minorities who were disproportionately lodged in the 
poor and working classes. Welfare services needed to sustain minority com­
munities have been drastically reduced. Meanwhile, the highly flawed growth of 
the 1980s and a restructured labor market negated or froze many gains minorities 
had made earlier. Poverty levels for African Americans and Hispanics have 
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increased markedly. Over the period from 1973 to 1985, whites had (in crude 
terms) barely held their own with an adjusted family income gain of 0.3 percent, 
but Hispanic Americans lost 2.4 percent and African Americans, 8.7 percent 46 
This, of course, does not reveal an even starker truth: the United States during 
these years had become a more unequal society on every level, between and 
within ethnic groups and between classes and age groups. 
Finally, there is the rather dubious legacy of Reaganism. Rather than the 
powerful, competent, hegemonic power the Reagan experiment promised to 
restore the United States to, there is a nation fitting quite weU"the classical model 
of a failing economic power. "47 This is not the framework conducive to African 
American and Hispanic progress; the mean conjunction of economic decay, 
symbolic racism, and a series of interlocking structural mechanisms would seem 
to augur a further deepening of racial inequities. 
In the absence of an interracial-interethnic coalition seeking broad changes 
in American society, greater polarization and fragmentation of our citizenry by 
race, class and ethnicity seems likely. This may eventually undermine the 
functioning of a rather fragile democracy. 
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